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TRADITION AND AUTHORITATIVE REASONING: 
A NONFOUNDATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
JOHN E. THIEL 
Fairfield University, Connecticut 
A DISTINCTIVE TRAIT of Roman Catholic theology is the authority accorded to tradition as a normative source for its interpretation 
alongside Scripture and, at least in the modern period, experience. In 
the 19th and 20th centuries, theologians have come to recognize that 
the authority of ecclesial tradition can be reconciled with the fact of its 
historical development, a view that is by now an axiom of Catholic 
theology as well as an interpretive assumption of the magisterium.1 
And yet surprisingly, little critical attention has been given to how 
tradition is authoritative for theology when tradition is itself develop-
ing dramatically. 
In these pages I would like to reflect on this issue, first, by proposing 
a criterion for the tentative identification of dramatically developing 
doctrine, second, by considering the teachings of Humanae vitae and 
Inter insigniores as possible illustrations of such doctrine, and third, by 
examining the issues of authority and theological responsibility in 
relation to a shared characteristic of these doctrines, i.e. the magiste-
rium's use of reasoning and argument in its teaching. In the fourth and 
fifth sections, nonfoundationalist criticism will provide a constructive 
resource for understanding the workings of reasoning in magisterial 
teaching and the expectations of such reasoning in the developing 
Catholic tradition. 
DRAMATICALLY DEVELOPING DOCTRINE: DEFINITION AND CRITERIA 
By "dramatically" developing doctrine, I mean doctrine that is de-
veloping in such a way that its current authority as the authentic 
teaching of the magisterium will be lost at some later moment in the 
life of the Church, and that exhibits signs in the present moment that 
this final loss has begun to take place. The authority of such doctrine 
in the Church's present life presents a knotty problem for all in the 
Church, though here our concern will focus on Catholic theologians 
1
 The Second Vatican Council's "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation" explic-
itly teaches the development of Catholic tradition (Dei verbum no. 8). Translations of the 
conciliar documents are from Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Doc-
uments, ed. A. Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.: Costello, 1987). A more recent statement 
of the International Theological Commission, which one can assume enjoys the support 
of the magisterium, outlines normative principles for theological interpretation in the 
context of developing tradition; see On the Interpretation of Dogmas (April 21,1990), in 
Origins 20 no. 1 (17 May 1994) 1-14. 
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and their work. On the one hand, Catholic theologians affirm their 
interpretive responsibility to the "Word of God, whether in its written 
form or in the form of Tradition," i.e. the "doctrine, life, and worship" 
of the Church handed down "to every generation." Moreover, Catholic 
theologians recognize the authority of the teaching office or magiste-
rium of the Church which has been entrusted with "the task of giving 
an authentic interpretation of the Word of God."2 On the other hand, 
as moderns, Catholic theologians recognize the fact of the development 
of doctrine and the role played by creative theological reflection in 
promulgating that development through the years. Moreover, his-
torico-critical study has demonstrated that doctrine occasionally has 
developed in such a way that the authentic teaching of the magiste-
rium in an earlier historical moment later lost authority.3 As they 
encounter doctrine presently and authentically taught by the magis-
terium, Catholic theologians sometimes find themselves judging that a 
doctrine will undergo development in this fashion, so that the author-
itative teaching of today will not be the authoritative teaching of some 
tomorrow. Hence our knotty problem: How is tradition, in the midst of 
such development, authoritative for theology? 
This knotty problem, of course, also suggests another: By what cri-
teria does the theologian judge authentic teaching to be currently in a 
state of "dramatic development"? There are several ways of answering 
this question. An answer of wide interpretive latitude might suggest 
that all doctrine is developing because even the most basic teachings of 
tradition are always being appropriated anew in the present moment 
of faith. Karl Rahner expresses this sensibility in his well-known ob-
servation that the Chalcedonian decree on the person of Christ is not 
an end but a beginning, i.e. of interpretive meaning.4 If all doctrine 
remains in development in this way, then one might think that dra-
matic development is always at least a possibility for all doctrine. Such 
cannot be the case, however, for were this possibility to be realized for 
a doctrine as basic as the Chalcedonian dogma, the result would be 
the development of another tradition rather than the development of 
doctrine within the Catholic tradition. Clearly, then, all doctrine can-
not develop dramatically, at least not without rendering the matters 
2
 Dei verbum nos. 8, 10. 
3
 See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., "Development in Moral Doctrine," TS 54 (1993) 
662—77. Noonan's examples are magisterial teachings on the moral issues of usury, 
marriage, slavery, and religious freedom. An example of development in a doctrine of 
faith leading to its loss of authority is Pius XII's exclusion of Christians not in commu-
nion with Rome from membership in the Church in the encyclical Mystici corporis 
Christi (no. 102), a teaching reversed in Vatican IFs "Decree on Ecumenism" (Unitatis 
redintegratio no. 3). See John H. Wright, S.J., "That All Doubt May Be Removed," 
America 171 no. 3 (30 July 1994) 18-19. 
4
 Karl Rahner, "Current Problems in Christology," in Theological Investigations 1, 
trans. C. Ernst (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961) 149-51. 
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under consideration moot for want of the very tradition in which they 
are meaningful. 
Our search for criteria for judging when doctrine is currently in a 
state of dramatic development might appeal to Catholic dogmatic pre-
suppositions themselves. At the very least, one might think, doctrine 
that is not infallible may be capable of dramatic development. Yet this 
negative and minimal criterion, it turns out, is useless for making our 
judgment concretely because it begs the question in two respite. First, 
since the infallibility of doctrine expresses the infallibility of the whole 
Church's faith, that infallibility often does not reach theyievel of ex-
plicit definition, say, in the decrees of ecumenical councils and the 
occasional pronouncements of the extraordinary magisterium. Thus, 
while the assumptions of Catholic dogma seem to imply that dramatic 
development could only occur among noninfallible doctrines, the lack 
of explicit definition of infallible teaching makes it/difficult to know 
with precision which doctrines are infallible and which are not. This, 
of course, is just a more fundamental way of stating our initial problem 
of determining criteria for doctrine currently in a state of dramatic 
development. Second, reference to a doctrine's noninfallible character 
as a minimal criterion for judging an instance of dramatic develop-
ment means little if that doctrine is taught authentically by the mag-
isterium, presumably as the unerring faith of the whole Church. Cath-
olic theologians are responsible to that authentic teaching and yet 
know that on several occasions magisterial teaching has developed 
dramatically. This dilemma again brings us to our problem. No facile 
distinction between infallible and noninfallible doctrines, then, will 
enable us to identify dramatically developing doctrine with any reli-
ability. 
Catholic belief in the infallibility of the Church, though, suggests 
another criterion that proves more reliable. According to the Second 
Vatican Council, the "whole body of the faithful who have an anointing 
that comes from the holy one . . . cannot err in matters of belief." This 
unerring belief appears in "the supernatural appreciation of the faith 
(sensus fidei) of the whole people, when . . . they manifest a universal 
consent in matters of faith or morals."5 The sensus fidei is not a self-
subsistent belief isolated from other dimensions of ecclesial life and 
practice, including the hierarchical teaching office. Indeed, the unerr-
ing sense of the faith is guided by the magisterium, relying on its 
teaching for the preservation of its truth. Yet, at the same time, the 
sense of the faith is the faith of the "People of God,.. . from the bishops 
to the last of the faithful,"6 and so it cannot simply be reduced to the 
teaching of the magisterium. Magisterial teaching that has not been 
received in belief and practice by a wide segment of the faithful, then, 
5
 Lumen gentium no. 12. 6
 Ibid. 
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offers a more reliable, but still incomplete, criterion for judging when 
doctrine is currently in a state of dramatic development. 
This criterion is not without its ambiguities. Sociological findings 
may be helpful in locating teaching not received by the faithful, but 
polling results alone cannot establish the extent of doctrinal reception. 
In addition, there remains the theological issue of how one under-
stands Lumen gentium's reference to "the whole body of the faithful" in 
which infallibility resides. Does this phrase refer to the baptized, to 
practitioners of the faith, or more self-referentially to those who do 
indeed possess the unerring sense of the faith, however difficult it may 
be to determine its character or their number? This question points to 
the inherent difficulties attending judgments about doctrinal recep-
tion. Although appeal may be made to social-scientific data in testing 
the reception of doctrine in the Church, one must rely finally on the 
sense of the faith itself in judging whether doctrine has been received 
by the faithful, who in turn evaluate the legitimacy of the judgment. In 
any case, defining the unerring faithful as those who receive all mag-
isterial teaching in faith and practice wrongly equates the infallibility 
of the Church with obedience to the magisterium in any particular 
historical moment, and ignores both the dynamics of doctrinal devel-
opment and the fact of dramatic development in the tradition. The 
criterion of reception, then, remains ambiguous, though by nature and 
not by fault. This ambiguity can be mitigated somewhat by two sup-
plementary criteria. 
A second criterion forjudging current dramatic development is that 
the magisterium also invokes theological argument in the presenta-
tion of its teaching. The magisterial practice of supporting teaching 
with or actually offering teaching through theological argument can 
be found as early in the tradition as Leo Fs fifth-century Tome on the 
person of Christ7 or as recently as an encyclical of Paul VI and an 
instruction of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to which 
we will soon turn for examples.8 The magisterial use of argument to 
convey authentic teaching is not necessarily a symptom of its nonin-
fallible character, as the illustration of Leo's Tome, a strong textual 
influence on the Chalcedonian decree, testifies. But the use of theolog-
ical argument in magisterial teaching is a reliable symptom that the 
doctrine taught is in a state of development which itself prompts the 
need for argument. There are three reasons for this argumentative 
7
 Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum 
de Rebus Fidei et Morum, 33d ed. (Freiburg im Briesgau: Herder, 1966) 102-104, nos. 
290-95. There is an English translation of the complete text in Christology of the Later 
Fathers, ed. E. Hardy (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1954) 360-70. 
8
 Comparisons of magisterial practice across centuries yet must acknowledge the dif-
ferent understandings of teaching authority that have flourished in the Church; see 
Yves Congar, O.P., "A Semantic History of the Term 'Magisterium,' " in Readings in 
Moral Theology No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality, ed. Charles Curran and Richard 
McCormick (New York: Paulist, 1982) 306-7. 
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need to which we can refer respectively as the circumstantial, the 
logical, and the rhetorical. First, argument is deemed necessary be-
cause the teaching addresses changing cultural circumstances in 
which a simple reiteration of traditional doctrine would not suffice. 
Argument serves as a way of mediating traditional meaning to novel 
issues, problems, or situations. Second, argument is deemed necessary 
because this mediated teaching requires a specific and convincing ap-
plication of the tradition's more basic beliefs, an application that rep-
resents a movement to doctrine more derivative, though not necessar-
ily less authoritative. Logic (here following its traditional rules!) 
serves the magisterium by demonstrating the reasonableness of the 
application, by showing how the teaching's conclusion derives its au-
thority from a major premise (more basic beliefs) rightly modified by 
its minor (changing cultural circumstances).9 Third, argument is 
deemed necessary because unanimity in the Church is lacking for the 
doctrine in question. Argument thus has the rhetorical goal of persua-
sion. 
These first two criteria for dramatic development, when taken to-
gether—magisterial teaching that one judges not to have been widely 
received by the faithful and that presents its teaching through theo-
logical argument—provide good direction for determining doctrine 
clearly in a state of development. A third criterion must be added, 
however, for distinguishing development that is more likely to be dra-
matic. That criterion, itself a supplement to the previous two, is that 
the theological argument by which magisterial teaching is supported 
or conveyed does not prove convincing to a wide segment of Catholic 
theologians. If the magisterium supports or conveys its teaching by the 
logical application of more basic beliefs to changing circumstances in 
order to persuade the faithful who are disinclined toward its reception, 
and that argumentation does not convince a wide segment of those in 
the Church knowledgeable about the tradition to which it appeals and 
able to assess the viability of the argumentative application to present 
circumstances, then there is a greater likelihood that such teaching is 
developing dramatically than if such conditions did not prevail. Dra-
matic development could be encouraged in such an eventuality as theo-
logians offered criticism of the current teaching, showing how and why 
the doctrinal argument advanced did not justify the teaching or offer-
ing alternative arguments that advanced another version of consis-
tency with traditional beliefs and with the current beliefs of many in 
the Church. 
The addition of this criterion to the first two might suggest some 
misunderstandings that need to be addressed quickly. First, this cri-
terion's attention to the cogency of magisterial argument among theo-
9
 For an interesting discussion of logical mediation in religious doctrinal traditions, 
see William A. Christian, Sr., Doctrines of Religious Communities: A Philosophical 
Study (New Haven: Yale University, 1987) esp. 12-114. 
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logians should not suggest that theologians speak for all the faithful. 
All the faithful are not concerned with arguments for the justification 
of belief or argument as the expression of belief, whereas theologians 
as a matter of professional knowledge and responsibility are. With 
respect to the matter of cogency in magisterial argument, they thus 
offer a gauge that one would not expect to find among large numbers 
of the faithful. Second, this criterion could seem to regard theologians 
as a final court of appeal in the assessment of the Church's teaching, as 
though the authority of theologians trumped the authority of the mag-
isterium. As already noted, this view is contrary to Catholic belief and 
is not defended here. With regard to both of these concerns, this last 
criterion has no standing in its own right, as though magisterial teach-
ing would need to be cogent to theologians before its enduring value for 
the Church could be established. Rather, this criterion is only mean-
ingful in its relationship to the first two, all three together forming a 
unified complex of criteria for distinguishing likely instances of dra-
matic development: magisterial teaching that one judges not to have 
been widely received by the faithful and that presents its teaching 
through theological argument that does not prove convincing to a wide 
segment of theologians. 
Our single evaluative principle attempts to identify dramatically 
developing doctrine by way of counterpoint to the Catholic belief that 
the infallibility of the Church dwells among all the faithful. It offers, 
then, a criteriological via negativa whose powers of identification can 
never constitute a proof, and no more than an indication, of doctrine in 
dramatic development. We would do well to think of it as a heuristic 
that enables us to consider our problem of the authority of such doc-
trine further, and we may do so by examining three examples of recent 
magisterial teaching. 
POSSIBLE EXAMPLES OF DRAMATICALLY DEVELOPING DOCTRINE 
Paul VFs encyclical Humanae vitae ("On the Regulation of Birth," 
1968), and the teaching of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith Inter insigniores ("On the Question of the Admission of Women 
to the Ministerial Priesthood," 1976), offer, I believe, examples of 
church teaching that fit our now single criterion of dramatic develop-
ment. We can proceed by examining each in turn with regard to the 
three aspects of our criterion: reception, argument, and cogency. 
Humanae Vitae 
Humanae vitae develops by argumentation the teaching of Pius XFs 
encyclical Casti connubii (1930) that it is sinful to "deliberately frus-
trate [the] natural power and purpose" of the "conjugal act [which] is 
destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children."10 Paul VTs 
10
 Pius XI, Casti connubii (December 31, 1930), in The Papal Encyclicals: 1903-1939, 
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1968 encyclical more specifically forbids the artificial regulation of 
birth by direct abortion, direct sterilization, or by "any action, which 
either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specif-
ically intended to prevent procreation"11 as contrary to the natural law 
and thus to the will of God. Any consideration of this teaching's recep-
tion among the faithful would need to acknowledge differences among 
the three forms of regulation that the teaching equally judges illicit. 
Abortion, for example, differs from sterilization and any other artifi-
cial means of regulating birth because it involves "the direct interrup-
tion of the generative process already begun."12 And even though 
many in the Church would qualify by context and circumstance the 
encyclical's absolute strictures against abortion, "even for therapeutic 
reasons,"13 few in the Church would not regard abortion as a tragic act. 
On the other hand, many social-scientific studies conducted in the past 
twenty-five years have found that a large percentage of Catholics do 
not practice the encyclical's proscription of artificial, preventive means 
of regulating births.14 Although I know of no sociological study that 
has made such a comparison, I think it fair to say that among those 
who do not practice this aspect of the encyclical's teaching few would 
regard the use of artificial, preventive means of birth control to con-
stitute a tragedy of the proportions of abortion. Indeed, few who prac-
tice such forms of birth control would regard their actions as tragic at 
all. If this judgment is sound, then it is Humanae vitae's prohibition of 
artificial, preventive means of birth control in particular that has not 
found reception among a wide constituency of the faithful. Our further 
consideration of the encyclical will focus on this aspect of its teaching 
as a possible example of dramatically developing doctrine. 
Humanae vitae presents its teaching through argument for all three 
reasons noted above. The encyclical begins by noting the changing 
historical circumstances that have prompted its teaching, among them 
the rapid increase in the world's population, a new social understand-
ing of the dignity of women, and technological advances that permit 
the rational control of nature, including the natural laws of reproduc-
ed. C. Carlen (Raleigh, N.C.: McGrath, 1981) 391-414, no. 54. For a most thorough 
discussion of the history of the teaching, see John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A 
History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University, 1965). 
11
 Paul VI, Humanae vitae (July 25,1968), in The Papal Encyclicals: 1958-1981, ed. C. 
Carlen (Raleigh, N.C.: McGrath, 1981) 223-33, no. 14. 
12
 Ibid. 13Ibid. 
14
 A typical statistic is offered in a recent Gallup poll which found that 84% of Amer-
ican Catholics believed they "should be allowed to practice artificial means of birth 
control," while 13% believed they should not be allowed (The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 
1993 [Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1994] 145). A 1994 New York Times/CBS 
News poll found that 98% of American Catholics 18-29 years of age practice artificial 
birth control, 91% of those 30-44, 85% of those 45-64, and 72% of those 65 and older 
(The New York Times [1 June 1994] B8). 
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tion.15 One might see Paul VTs unprecedented formation of an advi-
sory commission (and one that included lay members) to study and 
report to him on the issues of the encyclical as an expression of his 
keen sense that the Church faced circumstances novel enough to pre-
clude a simple reiteration of the teaching of Casti connubii. To the 
encyclical's own list of such circumstances one might add the growing 
lack of the traditional teaching's reception among the faithful. 
The logical argument developed in Humanae vitae to defend the 
prohibition of artificial, preventive forms of birth control is relatively 
simple. Its major premise is the basic Christian belief that all lives 
should be open, and faithful in action, to God's will. This major is 
qualified by two minor premises: God's will is inscribed in the natural 
law which governs procreative acts in marriage and the consummate 
meaning of sexual union in marriage lies in its fecundity,16 and in the 
inseparable connection between its "unitive" and "procreative signifi-
cance," sexual union "fully retains its sense of true mutual love and its 
ordination to the supreme responsibility of parenthood. . . ,"17 Logical 
mediation from the major premise to the first of these two minor 
premises results in the encyclical's particular conclusion bearing on 
the intentional possibilities of the married couple pondering a repro-
ductive decision: "From this it follows that they are not free to act as 
they choose in the service of transmitting life, as if it were wholly up 
to them to decide what is the right course to follow."18 Both minor 
premises are invoked to arrive at the conclusion of the Church's tra-
ditional teaching: 
The Church, nevertheless, in urging men to the observance of the precepts of 
the natural law, which it interprets by its constant doctrine, teaches that each 
and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to the 
procreation of human life.19 
Artificial, preventive forms of birth control are forbidden because they 
destroy this intrinsic relationship between the unitive and procreative 
dimensions of sexual union, and thereby elevate the will of the married 
couple above the will of God both for the general institution of mar-
riage and for their particular lives. Since the encyclical begins by 
acknowledging the "questions"20 these matters have provoked in the 
Church, and moves to its final section by anticipating that "not every-
one will easily accept this particular teaching,"*1 it offers its argument 
in recognition of a lack of unanimity among the faithful on this issue, 
undoubtedly with persuasion as one its goals. 
Demonstrating that the argument of Humanae vitae has not proved 
cogent to a wide segment of theologians would be a rather redundant 
15
 Humanae vitae no. 2. 16 Ibid. no. 9. 
17
 Ibid. no. 12. 18 Ibid. no. 10. 
19
 Ibid. no. 11. 20 Ibid. nos. 1-3. 
21
 Ibid. no. 18. 
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task. Indeed, the many criticisms leveled by theologians at the encyc-
lical's reasoning stand side by side with this teaching's lack of recep-
tion as the clearest illustrations of the problem of authority in the 
contemporary Church. One would be hard-pressed to find a critic who 
challenged the encyclical's major premise—that all lives should be 
open, and faithful in action, to God's will. Humanae vitaés theological 
critics addressed instead the validity of both minor premises, and the 
manner of their logical relation to the major to yield the teaching's 
conclusion. Charles Curran, for example, criticizes the encyclical's 
"physicalism," its inscription of the divine will upon every conjugal act 
as though providence works exclusively in the teleology of biologi-
cal structures.22 And when reasoning is put at issue, the encyclical's 
physicalist assumptions prevent its logic from distinguishing between 
the major and minor premises in its argument. One might even say 
that the argument's minor premises so eclipse its major that it becomes 
impossible logically to reach the reasonable conclusion, say, that a 
married couple could be open to the will of God by having a fecund 
marriage while yet at times practicing artificial contraception. Joseph 
Komonchak notes that the encyclical makes no attempt to justify what 
we have called its minor premises and so, though appearing to be an 
argument, is no argument at all.23 Karl Rahner observes that argu-
ments from the natural law, like Humanae vitae% cannot prescind 
from the expectation of logical cogency, since reasonableness is at least 
one of the expectations of appeal to the natural law. And yet this 
cogency, he judges, is lacking in the encyclical's line of argument 
which does little more than state its premises.24 
If space permitted, we could treat a number of other consequential 
criticisms of the encyclical's argument, especially those that find a 
conflict in moral intentionality posed by its approval of the rhythm 
method of birth control. Let it suffice to say that the many theologians 
who have criticized the teaching of Humane vitae have done so by 
attending to the inconsistencies they have found in the reasoning with 
which its teaching was promulgated. 
Inter Insigniores 
Inter insigniores, which presents a rationale for the Church's long-
established practice of restricting priestly ordination to men, is a 
teaching published on October 15, 1976 by the Congregation for the 
22
 Charles E. Curran, "Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Theology," in Contra-
ception: Authority and Dissent, ed. C. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969) 
159-60. Cf. Charles E. Curran, Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1979) 30-31. 
23
 Joseph A. Komonchak, "Humanae Vitae and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflec-
tions," TS 39 (1978) 252. 
24
 Karl Rahner, "On the Encyclical 'Humane Vitae,' " in Theological Investigations 11, 
trans. D. Bourke (New York: Seabury, 1974) 276-77. 
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Doctrine of the Faith with the approval of Paul VI. Like Humanae 
vitae, Inter insigniores seems not to have met wide reception among the 
faithful. In fact, sociological evidence suggests that the acceptability of 
the ordination of women among Catholics in the years since the doc-
ument's publication has increased substantially. For example (and one 
typical of North American and Western European countries), a 1977 
Gallup poll found 41% of American Catholics to favor the ordination of 
women, a statistic that increased to 63% by 1993.25 As noted earlier, 
one must be wary about reducing the sensus fidei to the findings of 
sociologists and doubly wary about the Catholic beliefs of some nations 
standing as the belief of the whole Church. Yet this increase of belief 
in the ordination of women is telling, and enough so to judge that the 
teaching of the Church in question has not been widely received by the 
faithful. The most likely explanations for this increase are a growing 
awareness of injustices toward women in traditional societies, the 
strength of movements for the equal rights of women, and a resulting 
expansion of the role of women in social structures and responsibilities 
customarily reserved for men. One cannot completely discount, how-
ever, the influence of the document's argument itself on the increas-
ingly wider lack of reception of the teaching among the faithful over 
this period of time.26 
We find in Inter insigniores all three reasons, circumstantial, logical, 
and rhetorical, for the appeal to argument in the promulgation of mag-
isterial teaching. The exclusive ordination of men to the priesthood is, 
after all, a practice that dates in some form to the first-century Church. 
The felt need to justify such an ancient practice stems from changing 
circumstances in which argument is called upon to defeat challenges to 
the tradition. The document's opening paragraphs identify those 
changing circumstances as the modern recognition of the full equality 
of women, the wider participation of women in the apostolate of the 
Church, the unqualified admission of women to pastoral office in some 
Protestant churches, and arguments by Catholic theologians for 
the ordination of women to the priesthood.27 
Logical mediation is deemed necessary in Inter insigniores to bring 
the tradition's most basic beliefs to bear upon these changing circum-
stances. There are several ancillary arguments in the document that 
25
 The 1977 Gallup poll is cited in Leonard Swidler, "Roma Locuta, Causa Finita?" in 
Women Priests: A Catholic Commentary on the Vatican Declaration, ed. L. Swidler and 
A. Swidler (New York: Paulist, 1977) 3. A 1993 Gallup poll found that 33% of Catholic 
respondents "strongly agreed" and 30% "moderately agreed" that it would be "a good 
thing if women were allowed to be ordained as priests" (The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 
1993 144). A 1994 New York Times/CBS News poll found that 59% of American Cath-
olics favored the ordination of women to the priesthood (The New York Times [1 June 
1994] B8). 
26
 See Leonard Swidler, "Roma Locuta, Causa Finita?" 3. 
27
 Inter insigniores, "Vatican Declaration: Women in the Ministerial Priesthood," Or-
igins 6 no. 33 (3 February 1977) 517-24, nos. 1, 3, 4. 
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serve to refute defenses of the ordination of women based on Scripture 
and history. The teaching notes in passing, for example, that the "un-
deniable influence of prejudices unfavorable to women" in the writings 
of the Church Fathers had negligible effect on their pastoral practice 
and spiritual direction.28 The argument "from origins" continues by 
observing that "Jesus did not call any woman to become part of the 
Twelve" even though his attitude toward women did not conform to, 
and indeed even "deliberately and courageously broke with," the cus-
toms of his time.29 Moreover, the apostles did not consider women 
candidates to complete the Twelve in the Pentecost Church, even 
though Mary herself occupied a privileged place in their circle. Nor did 
Paul extend fall ministerial powers to women.30 As important as these 
arguments "from origins" are in the document for defending the con-
tinuity of ecclesial practice against counterarguments for change, they 
are secondary to what we will call its argument "from representation." 
Although Inter insigniores portrays its reasoning "from representa-
tion" as a matter "of clarifying [its] teaching by the analogy of faith" 
and not as a matter "of bringing forward a demonstrative argument,"31 
the manner in which its premises lead to its conclusion seem to involve 
elementary deduction. The argument's major premise is the "Church's 
constant teaching" that "the bishop or the priest, in the exercise of his 
ministry, does not act in his own name, in persona propria: he repre-
sents Christ, who acts through him. . . ." In the ministry, then, the 
priest "acts not only through the effective power conferred on him by 
Christ, but in persona Christi"*2 This major premise is qualified by the 
minor premise that the incarnation of the Word "took place according 
to the male sex," a fact that does not imply a superiority of men over 
women but which nonetheless conveys a harmony in the plan of sal-
vation revealed by God and symbolically important for the economy of 
revelation.33 Logical mediation yields the conclusion of the teaching 
that women cannot be priests because as females they could not act 
ministerially in persona Christi since the savior was a male. This ar-
gument's minor premise addresses contemporary cultural shifts in 
which feminist sensibilities would no longer assume that metaphysical 
conceptions like persona are intrinsically male or would insist that 
such conceptions transcend social (and ecclesial) bias only when they 
are understood in a gender-inclusive manner. The rhetoric of the ar-
gument exhibits an awareness of the claims of these sensibilities and 
of the need to convince those who find the traditional belief incredi-
ble—even to the point that the document anticipates and rebuffs coun-
terarguments to the centrality it accords to the maleness of Christ. 
As we found in the case oí Humanae vitae, so many theologians have 
found the argumentation of Inter insigniores to be problematic that 
Ibid. no. 6. M Ibid. no. 10. 
Ibid. nos. 14-17. 31 Ibid. no. 25. 
Ibid. no. 26. 33 Ibid. nos. 28, 30. 
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demonstrating its lack of cogency to a wide segment of their number 
becomes a redundant task. While several theological responses have 
criticized Inter insigniores's appeals to Scripture and the history of 
the early Church as legitimate warrant for its exclusion of women 
from priestly ordination,34 the most consequential criticism has ad-
dressed the argument "from representation." Elizabeth Johnson, 
among others, has criticized the crucial role of Jesus's maleness in the 
argument by setting its notion of representation in the orthodox Chris-
tological tradition. The Cappadocian rule of faith "what is not assumed 
is not saved," she notes, defined the proper understanding of human 
persona in the fourth-century controversy on the humanity of Christ. 
The rule judged wanting any notion of the humanity of Christ that 
excluded anything essentially human from his existence, since the 
excluded human dimension would not share in the hypostatic union 
and so not enjoy the union's saving effects. "If maleness is constitutive 
for the incarnation and redemption," Johnson observes, "female hu-
manity is not assumed and therefore not saved."35 Privileging Jesus' 
maleness as Inter insigniores does particularizes the human notion of 
persona in a way that puts it at odds with the ancient rule of faith, thus 
destroying both the Christian notion of human person implicit in the 
rule and any possibility of its legitimate representation, even and per-
haps especially if the object of representation is the person of Christ. 
Johnson concludes that an "egalitarian anthropology that holds that 
women and men are equally created in the image of God, and are 
equally one in Christ through the waters of baptism" offers a more 
adequate resource for considering the issue of priestly ordination.36 
From the perspective of the argument's logical structure, we might 
understand her point to be that such an egalitarian anthropology 
would better shape a minor premise, and so properly qualify the ma-
jor's largely uncontested expectation that the priest in ministerial du-
ties represents the person of Christ. 
Both teachings, then, appear to fit our criterion of dramatically de-
veloping doctrine, primarily because they seem not to have been 
widely received by the faithful and secondarily, yet importantly, be-
cause they also advance their teaching by arguments that have not 
34
 E.g. Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "The Twelve," and "The Apostleship of Women 
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Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992) 153. 
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 Ibid. 
TRADITION AND AUTHORITATIVE REASONING 639 
proved convincing to those in the Church professionally committed to 
the task of bringing understanding to faith. 
ARGUMENTS THAT MATTER NOT 
The reader might benefit from a reminder at this point that our 
efforts thus far to identify candidates for dramatically developing doc-
trine serve our broader purpose of considering the theological problem 
of such doctrine's authority. One could address this issue in a general 
fashion simply by reference to the large body of literature on authority 
in the Church, the teaching prerogatives of the magisterium, and theo-
logical responsibility that has appeared since the Second Vatican 
Council. I would like to pursue this question more specifically, though, 
by focusing on two of the features proposed here for candidates for such 
doctrine: the arguments offered to advance a teaching, and their co-
gency. 
If both doctrines fit our criterion on the counts of reception, argu-
ment, and cogency, they also share another commonality with regard 
to the latter two aspects. Humanae vitae directly and the broader mag-
isterial tradition of Inter insigniores indirectly subscribe to the view 
that finally neither their arguments nor the cogency of their argu-
ments are consequential to the authority of their teaching. Humanae 
vitae expresses this position in its pastoral directives to priests: 
For it is your principal duty—We are speaking especially to you who teach 
moral theology—to spell out clearly and completely the Church's teaching on 
marriage. In the performance of your ministry you must be the first to give an 
example ofthat sincere obedience, inward as well as outward, which is due to 
the magisterium of the Church. For, as you know, the pastors of the Church 
enjoy a special light of the Holy Spirit in teaching the truth. And this, rather 
than the arguments they put forward, is why you are bound to such obedi-
ence.37 
This same point is made indirectly in the magisterium's recent 
teaching on the exclusion of women from priestly ordination, not in 
Inter insigniores but in John Paul IFs promulgation of its doctrine in 
Ordinatio saeerdotalis ("Apostolic Letter on Ordination and Women," 
May 22, 1994). This text notes the conclusions of Inter insigniores's 
arguments "from origins," fails to mention what many would consider 
to be its principal argument "from representation," reiterates the con-
stancy of the Church's universal tradition in excluding women from 
priestly ordination, and concludes with the pope's particular contribu-
tion to the issue: 
Wherefore, in order that all doubt may be removed regarding a matter of great 
importance, a matter which pertains to the church's divine constitution itself, 
Humanae vitae no. 28. 
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in virtue of my ministry of confirming the brethren . . . I declare that the 
church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women 
and that this judgment is to be definitively held by all the church's faithful.38 
The status and purport of this teaching continue to be discussed in the 
Church. For our purposes it is important to note that the pope provides 
the context for his teaching in the remarks that precede the declara­
tion quoted above. In spite of the Church's consistent teaching even to 
the present day, the reservation of priestly ordination to men alone, he 
states, "in some places . . . is nonetheless considered still open to de­
bate, or the church's judgment that women are not to be admitted to 
ordination is considered to have a merely disciplinary force."39 If the 
Apostolic Letter responds to these circumstances and offers its teach­
ing with the intention of removing doubt in the Church, then at least 
one of its purposes is to close debate on this issue. This purpose, I 
suggest, coupled with the Letter's omission of reference to Inter insig-
niores's central and most debated argument, amounts to an admission 
that neither magisterial arguments for the exclusion of women from 
priestly ordination nor their cogency finally matter, since the charism 
of the Church's teaching office alone is the basis of its authority. 
The final dispensability of argument in magisterial teachings con­
veyed by argument is affirmed as a general principle in the Congre­
gation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Instruction on the Ecclesial Vo­
cation of the Theologian (May 24, 1990). The Instruction addresses 
several matters concerning the responsibility of theologians to the 
magisterium, focusing particularly on the legitimacy and means of 
theological dissent from authentic teaching. One way in which theo­
logians defend the legitimacy of dissent from "non-irreformable mag­
isterial teaching,"40 it claims, is by adopting a hermeneutical posture 
that regards such teaching only as one voice among many in an ongo­
ing theological debate. "Certainly," the Instruction responds, 
it is one of the theologian's tasks to give a correct interpretation to the texts of 
the magisterium, and to this end he employs various hermeneutical rules. 
Among these is the principle which affirms that magisterial teaching, by vir­
tue of divine assistance, has a validity beyond its argumentation, which may 
derive at times from a particular theology.41 
Right theological interpretation, then, should regard the argumenta­
tion of magisterial teaching as supplementary to its conclusion, as, on 
the one hand, a dimension of its presentation that theologians must 
strive to understand with an "intense and patient reflection"42 and yet, 
3 8




 Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian, in Origins 20 no. 8 (5 July 
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on the other hand, a dispensable contingency should such reflection 
fail to yield the understanding sought. 
When all sincere effort to appreciate the truth of magisterial teach-
ing has proved fruitless, the theologian may express personal dissent 
only by the means of confiding privately in the magisterial authorities. 
One concern that might be communicated in this one valid practice of 
dissent is how "the arguments proposed to justify [the teaching]" are 
problematic. And when voiced privately, such objections can have the 
happy consequence of contributing "to real progress and [providing] a 
stimulus to the magisterium to propose the teaching of the church in 
greater depth and with a clearer presentation of the arguments."43 
While one rejoices in any manifestation of collegiality, reconciliation, 
and progress in the doctrine of the faith, one cannot help but notice 
that the results of this private consultation extend only to magisterial 
argumentation and not to magisterial conclusion. As a result, argu-
mentation becomes a gloss to conclusion—a supplement capable of 
clarification, modification, or even as much as separation without fear 
of effect upon the teaching it purports to convey. Perhaps the Instruc-
tion's expectation that an unsatisfactory resolution to private consul-
tation is a call to the theologian "to suffer for the truth, in silence and 
prayer"44 is yet another expression of its view that the weighing of 
ecclesial argument in public would be as useless as it is scandalous 
since the argumentative dimension of magisterial teaching finally 
matters not. 
Clearly the tone of our analysis suggests that something is amiss in 
the presumed separability of argument and conclusion in the authentic 
teaching of the magisterium. In the final section of this article I will 
try to show how the assumed contingency of magisterial argumenta-
tion bears on the theological problem of the authority of dramatically 
developing doctrine. At this point, however, I would state unequivo-
cally that this problem cannot be addressed by undermining in any 
way the charismatic authority of the Church's teaching office, itself 
one of the tradition's basic beliefs. A more fruitful approach to this 
problem would consider how reasoning properly justifies a tradition of 
basic beliefs and through such justification gains cogency among faith-
ful believers. The account of epistemic justification offered by nonfoun-
dationalist philosophers can help to shed light on these issues. 
ARGUMENTS WITHOUT "FOUNDATIONS" 
While there is no definable school that represents the epistemolog-
ica! sensibilities of nonfoundationalism, one could at least find a fam-
ily resemblance of such philosophical commitments in the tradition of 
American pragmatism. Building on the work of an older generation 
Ibid. no. 30. Ibid. no. 31; emphasis mine. 
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that includes Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John 
Dewey, contemporary pragmatiste like Wilfrid Sellare, Willard Van 
Orman Quine, Richard Rorty, and Richard Bernstein share several 
common assumptions that could be described as nonfoundationalist.45 
All are keenly suspicious of the Cartesian understanding of the philo-
sophical task in which thinking is called upon to establish a "first 
philosophy," an architectonic of all knowledge grounded on some im-
mediately experienced, self-certain principle that serves as "founda-
tions" for the entire edifice of knowledge. All oppose traditional un-
derstandings of the philosophical justification of belief in which rea-
soning is expected to show the validity of claims to knowledge finally 
by appeal to indubitable "foundations" on which such claims rest. All 
regard the business of philosophy, at least at this moment in its his-
tory, as the criticism of Cartesianism and the formulation of more 
adequate accounts of knowing in which claims to knowledge are jus-
tified without appeal to foundationalist principles. 
Although the nonfoundationalists frequently personify the founda-
tionalist error by reference to Descartes, foundationalism is as old as 
the Platonic tradition in Western philosophy. Whether the "founda-
tions" of knowing appear in philosophical accounts as Plato's eternal 
forms, Descartes's clear and distinct ideas, the givenness of sense ex-
perience for Locke, or Kant's transcendental categories of the under-
standing, they are esteemed by their proponents as immediately jus-
tified beliefs whose certainty justifies more derivative claims in the 
larger body of knowledge. Since the very purpose of "foundations" is to 
assure the indubitability of knowledge, or at the very least the possi-
bility of such unquestioned certainty, foundationalists ascribe univer-
sality to whatever principle they advance as the authenticator of truth 
claims. As Richard Rorty observes, foundationalists seem to assume 
that epistemic "foundations" possess an immediate veridical élan that 
permeates the entire system of knowledge and "causes" whatever 
truth dwells among its mediate claims.46 Noninferential and indisput-
able, the "foundations" provide a point of departure for logical deduc-
tion or a foothold for thinking's inductive climb toward valid knowl-
edge. 
Generally speaking, one could say that nonfoundationalist criticism 
makes its target any variety of rationalism or empiricism that expects 
"foundations" for knowledge, whether in ideas or sense data, to estab-
lish the certainty of epistemic claims. Traditionally, foundationalists 
have been anxious at the prospect of justifying claims to knowledge if 
45
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such foundations do not exist. Claims to knowledge, after all, can only 
be justified by appealing to other claims to knowledge. And if there is 
not an utterly basic claim, a knowledge whose immediate certainty is 
indubitable, then, the foundationalist fears, the justification of knowl-
edge becomes a dizzying, infinite spiral of skepticism in which even the 
possibility of certainty in any instance is jeopardized. Nonfoundation-
alist philosophers have argued that this, in Richard Bernstein's well-
known diagnosis, "Cartesian anxiety" is a needless worry, though one 
prompted by strong, epistemic prejudices.47 
The philosopher of science Wilfrid Sellars has argued that the foun-
dationalist conceptualization of knowledge is energized by what he 
calls the "myth of the given," the "idea that there are inner episodes, 
whether thoughts or so-called 'immediate experiences,' to which each 
of us has privileged access," inner episodes furnishing "premises on which 
empirical knowledge rests as on a foundation."48 While the givenness 
of experience is an ordinary fact of epistemic life, the imbuing of a 
particular dimension of experience with an authoritative givenness 
leads to the foundationalist schema of knowledge, in which a suppos-
edly certain experience is called upon to provide assurances that it 
really cannot. There is no evidence, Sellars contends, that such a foun-
dational, unmoved mover of knowledge exists. Indeed, as any number 
of the critics of foundationalism have been quick to point out, the 
many, and quite different, candidates for "foundations" in the history 
of philosophy mutually deconstruct their respective claims to immedi-
ate and obvious certainty. 
Typically, nonfoundationalists argue against foundationalism by of-
fering a view of knowledge in which its claims are relatively and mu-
tually defined, and in which the justification of knowledge is an ongo-
ing, révisable enterprise. Sellars, for example, points out that even the 
most basic report of a supposedly foundational sense experience—as in 
the claim "This looks red"—presupposes such a proliferating host of 
concepts, conditions, and circumstances that our wider network of 
claims to knowledge is inescapably implicated. And in this wider net-
work, epistemic claims are mutually constituted without appeal to any 
truth that is immediately given. Knowledge cannot but be inferential, 
even if one can distinguish between more basic or more complex di-
mensions of its inferential character. In Sellars's judgment, this reci-
procity between more basic and more complex modes of inferential 
knowledge does not compromise the authority of knowledge itself, but 
only the foundationalist authority of the myth of the given. "For em-
pirical knowledge," he states, "like its sophisticated extension, science, 
47
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is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-
correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not 
all at once."49 
Like Sellars, Willard Van Orman Quine rejects any rationalist or 
traditionally empiricist manner of accounting for human knowledge. 
Philosophy, he claims, provides no "a priori propaedeutic or ground-
work for science." Nor does it offer some "external vantage point" from 
which knowledge can be constructed. Rather, philosophy is "continu-
ous with science."50 Its task involves the critical examination of the 
formation of concepts from sensory evidence, the work of scientific 
construction itself. For Quine, though, the process of concept formation 
is inseparable from the formation of meaning in words, sentences, and 
the entire system of language itself. "Meaning is," Quine insists, "what 
it does," and what it does is place value on sensory stimulations in 
particular circumstances. Meaning is not a transcendental quality, a 
foundation on which sentences must rest in order to possess meaning, 
but a function of how sentences are used and through such use acquire 
significance.51 Meaning, then, is behaviorally layered within the com-
plex strands of sentences that configure the "web" of belief, Quine's 
compelling metaphor for knowledge itself. Though a foundationalist, 
to pursue the metaphor, might expect the web's fixed integrity to rest 
upon a single strand, Quine situates the web's meaningfulness in the 
constant revisions to its weaving called for by the circumstances of its 
use. Our "statements about the external world," he maintains, "face 
the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corpo-
rate body."52 And the corporate body of knowledge is not only founda-
tionless but also utterly flexible. 
Sellars's and Quine's nonfoundationalist perspective on the consti-
tution of knowledge also has implications for their understanding of 
epistemic justification, i.e. the task of providing arguments of suffi-
cient warrant for claims to knowledge or beliefs. Clearly, if knowledge 
does not possess foundations, then neither do the arguments one offers 
to justify beliefs. We have already noted that the prospect of founda-
tionless belief stirs the foundationalist's fear of an infinite justificatory 
regress in which even the possibility of warranted claims would be 
undercut. Sellars and Quine, however, do not find this prospect threat-
ening. The arguments by which belief is justified, they hold, need not 
lead logically to a final grounding principle that brings the business of 
making justificatory arguments to closure. Both regard justificatory 
49
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argumentation in support of claims to knowledge as an activity inter-
nal to the claims for which one argues. 
For Sellars, justifications of belief fall within the scope of theorizing, 
the activity of explaining the beliefs we hold. Their arguments, he 
proposes, are best understood as self-correcting, inductive generaliza-
tions, as accounts of a rational system's reasonable coherence offered 
from within its own network of belief. Similarly, Quine affirms this 
contextual, self-referential view of justification in what has come to be 
known as his doctrine of holism. According to this thesis, parts of 
theories, including for our purposes justificatory arguments, are "not 
separately vulnerable to adverse observations, because it is only jointly 
as a theory that they imply their observable consequences."53 Parts of 
theories, in other words, including the reasoned arguments on behalf 
of more basic background beliefs, do not simply collapse in the face of 
conflicting data. Justificatory arguments so foster the basic beliefs 
they serve—the two utterly intertwined in the proliferating network 
of claims to knowledge—that contrary evidence more typically will 
lead to their revision than to their abandonment. Both Sellars and 
Quine reject what Michael Williams has called a "genetic" conception 
of justification in which the cogency of arguments on behalf of beliefs 
is assumed to be caused by the immediately certain, foundationalist 
principle to which they are logically joined. Both understand justif-
icatory argumentation to be as foundationless, continuous, and resis-
tant to closure as our efforts to accommodate our language to experi-
ence. 
The purport of Sellars's and Quine's nonfoundationalist view on the 
task of justification is that what we call knowledge is its justification, 
itself an open-ended process of explaining—we might say arguing 
for—the beliefs valued in particular meaningful contexts. In the ab-
sence of "foundations," arguments are the principal means by which 
basic beliefs are themselves shaped, and by which their values gain 
cogency and thus authority. Arguments, then, are indispensable to 
claims to knowledge in this nonfoundationalist perspective, for the 
reasons they provide for beliefs not only support, relate, criticize and 
revise those claims but also are those claims themselves. By the same 
token, this nonfoundationalist understanding highlights the degree to 
which the contributions of argument to justification are diminished in 
a foundationalist understanding of knowledge. Deductive and induc-
tive arguments in such a foundationalist schema justify a truth claim 
that itself requires no justification since its epistemic authority is re-
garded as immediate and obvious. Whatever logical authority justifi-
catory arguments possess in a foundationalist conceptualization of 
53
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knowledge derives finally from the "foundations" from which such ar-
guments proceed or to which they lead in an epistemic return to ori-
gins. 
In this "genetic" conception of justification, such arguments are sep-
arable from, and so in some measure supplements to, their "founda-
tions." While the separability of "foundations" and argumentation is a 
constant in foundationalist argumentation, the extent of separability 
may vary. "Weak" versions of foundationalist argumentation may ac-
count for the logical connections between and among derivative, me-
diate claims to knowledge, showing, thereby, the integrity of the body 
of knowledge they present. Or such argumentation may confirm the 
purported certainty of foundationalist claims or experiences to which it 
has pledged logical allegiance. In comparison to a nonfoundationalist 
conception of justification, weak versions of foundationalist argumen-
tation diminish the value of argumentation, though argumentation is 
not so separable from its "foundations" that it can be deemed indis-
pensable. "Strong" versions of foundationalist argumentation dimin-
ish the value of argumentation even further. Resting assured that 
their justificatory explanations mirror the indubitability of their first 
principles, strong versions of foundationalism would regard their ar-
gumentation to be completely separable from, because they are utterly 
supplementary to, the "foundations" they serve. Here arguments, since 
they are but glosses to an immediately given truth, are finally dispens-
able and so matter little if at all.55 
REASONING WITH AUTHORITY 
In recent years a number of theologians have touted the value of a 
nonfoundationalist approach to knowledge for theological reflection. 
The advocates of this approach, most notably George Lindbeck, Ronald 
Thiemann, Stanley Hauerwas, and Charles Wood, largely have been 
Protestant theologians who have found the nonfoundationalist per-
spective helpful in refuting the apologetical use of universal theories 
in many modern theologies and in fostering a descriptive approach to 
theological interpretation consistent with a Reformation understand-
ing of theology as scriptural exegesis. While several Catholic theolo-
gians have produced works compatible with a nonfoundationalist per-
spective,56 this approach has often stirred Catholic suspicion, perhaps 
55
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because variations on the transcendental method advocated by influ-
ential Catholic theologians like Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, and 
David Tracy often are cited by Protestant nonfoundationalists as ex-
amples of the foundationalist error.57 There are any number of reasons 
for Catholic sensibilities to be wary of the nonfoundationalist approach 
to knowledge. There is no reason in principle, however, to think that 
nonfoundationalist philosophy could not prove helpful in illuminating 
Catholic commitments on any number of issues, especially the proper 
relationship between faith and reason. 
Like any philosophical stance, nonfoundationalist criticism can only 
be put to use legitimately in a Catholic setting if measured choices are 
made about which of its insights are valuable and how those insights 
are used to clarify beliefs that are basically Catholic. Catholic assump-
tions about the nature of religious reasoning, for example, could not 
possibly make room for the typically nonfoundationalist view that all 
knowledge is relative or that universality cannot be ascribed to truth 
claims. But to the degree that nonfoundationalist sensibilities work to 
expose exaggerated and finally unsustainable claims for the justifica-
tion of belief, and foster an understanding of the workings of reason 
true to our actual beliefs and practices, they are indispensable for 
appreciating the conduct of right reasoning, including the reasoning 
invoked as authoritative in the Catholic tradition by the magisterium, 
theologians, and the faithful. 
A nonfoundationalist perspective on the justification of belief sug-
gests that the magisterial understanding of argumentation in its 
teaching is foundationalist, and even strongly so. Extraecclesial sen-
sibilities would reach this conclusion, no doubt, because the magiste-
rium's authoritative appeal to the charism of its office would appear to 
be an immediately justified belief supporting the claims issuing from 
the exercise of office. In this view, the charge of foundationalism 
amounts to the judgment that magisterial arguments cannot possess 
authority since the teaching office does not possess the charism that 
supposedly grounds its authoritative claims. But one of the advantages 
of a nonfoundationalist perspective is its appreciation for how claims to 
knowledge are contextualized, standing always in a particular frame-
work of meaning in which commitment, practice, and belief interrelate 
as they serve more basic, if not foundationalist, beliefs. To the degree 
that the charism of the teaching office is a part of the common stock of 
basic Catholic beliefs, Catholic sensibilities would not find it to be 
comparable to the "foundations" that reason alone would criticize in 
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traditional epistemologies. Yet even within the circle of Catholic faith 
nonfoundationalist criticism suggests another respect in which mag-
isterial argumentation is foundationalist and so, measured by the very 
values of the Catholic tradition, in need of revision. 
On the face of it, the magisterium seems to exhibit a foundationalist 
regard for reasoning by skewing the proper argumentative relation-
ship between the Catholic tradition's basic beliefs and the reasoned 
extension of those basic beliefs to new circumstances. In Humanae 
vitae, for example, natural-law reasoning is so conflated with the tra-
dition's more basic belief in divine providence and human openness to 
God's workings in the world that the encyclical's natural-law argu-
ments eclipse their major premise, as though the family lives of be-
lievers could only be open to God's will if the practice of artificial 
contraception were excluded. Here, magisterial reasoning, now virtu-
ally eclipsing the basic belief, takes on the character of "foundations" 
that immediately justify the encyclical's teaching. By making male-
ness an indispensable trait of the savior's humanity, Inter insigniores 
also conflates argument with its premise that the priestly office rep-
resents the person of Christ, creating thereby "foundations" for belief 
that not only immediately justify its conclusion but also do so by con-
tradicting the tradition's basic, albeit indirect, teaching on the nature 
of humanity as embraced and saved by Jesus Christ. In both cases, an 
arguable claim is imbued with the certainty of a first principle, even 
though traditional beliefs more basic than those cited foundationalis-
tically stand ready in the context of faith as viable resources for au-
thoritative argument. 
The magisterium's judgment regarding the dispensability of argu-
mentation in its teaching further evinces a foundationalist regard for 
reasoning even within the setting of Catholic values, for this judgment 
so assumes the obvious certainty of the first principles seen to be re-
flected in the teaching's conclusion that the arguments by which it is 
reached do not share in its authority—an especially surprising stance 
in light of the fact that the teaching in question is presented as argu-
ment. This diremption between conclusion and argumentation—itself 
raised to a general principle of magisterial teaching in the Ecclesial 
Vocation of the Theologian—exhibits the foundationalist assumption 
that immediately justified beliefs "cause" the truth of mediately jus-
tified beliefs, an epistemic aetiology that in strong versions at least 
makes both argumentation and its cogency superfluous. 
While the magisterium is inclined to explain its regard for the dis-
pensability of argumentation by appeal to the charismatic authority of 
its office, a nonfoundationalist approach to the traditional knowledge 
it safeguards would expect that same charism to be exercised within 
the ongoing justification of belief in the history of faith. Within this 
ecclesial context, the magisterium occasionally practices the charism 
of authentic teaching by reiterating ancient beliefs so basic to the 
tradition's knowledge that they pass unquestioned from age to age. 
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Frequently, though, the magisterial charism is exercised in the exten-
sion of Catholicism's basic beliefs to present circumstances that call for 
their guidance or that challenge customary forms of their application. 
Argumentation is rightly regarded not as a merely accidental dimen-
sion of this extension but as the very way in which the magisterium, in 
the terminology of nonfoundationalist philosophers, justifies its 
present teaching with regard to the tradition's ancient and basic be-
liefs. This, of course, does not mean that the charism of the teaching 
office is in thrall to reasoning whose soundness is gauged by philo-
sophical criteria of one sort or another. The justification of the 
Church's belief takes place in the Catholic tradition's own authorita-
tive network of commitments, doctrines, and practices. But the expla-
nation of the faith that justification involves must be measured by 
standards of coherence and cogency that in their own terms are no less 
rigorous than any epistemic ideal. With regard to reasoning in mag-
isterial teaching, this means that the charism of the teaching office is 
meaningfully exercised within, and not apart from, the faithful argu-
mentation for uses to which basic beliefs might be put. When employed 
by the magisterium to convey its teaching, such argumentation is 
properly regarded as authentic and so to matter as much as a teach-
ing's conclusion since both are normatively bound to the tradition they 
promulgate. 
Our discussion brings us to the modest conclusion that arguments 
should be understood as authoritative in the Church's authentic teach-
ing, and as inseparable from the conclusions they advance. In light of 
our analysis we can now consider our original problem concerning the 
authority of dramatically developing doctrine for Catholic theology. 
Our efforts to consider this question, however tentative, must begin 
by noting the hermeneutical modesty with which this issue is rightly 
approached. The criterion for dramatically developing doctrine pre-
sented earlier in these pages offered not a sure method for identifying 
such doctrine but rather a heuristic for noticing possible, more likely 
candidates for presently authoritative Church teaching that may one 
day lose its authority. While reception was the most important aspect 
of this criterion, the supplementary aspects of argumentative presen-
tation and cogency together mark doctrine that is developing (because 
argument is deemed necessary to mediate basic beliefs to present cir-
cumstances) and perhaps developing dramatically (because the very 
arguments conveying doctrine that has not been received by the faith-
ful even fail to prove cogent to a wide segment of those in the Church 
qualified to judge the validity of argument). As noted earlier, the au-
thority of dramatically developing doctrine is an important issue for 
all in the Church, though our concern here more specifically is with the 
authority of such doctrine for theological reflection, itself often a con-
siderable influence on the dynamics of development in any form. And 
any theological judgment regarding even the possible identification of 
dramatically developing doctrine does well to acknowledge its own 
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potential for error. After all, our two possible examples of dramatically 
developing doctrine have long had a place in the belief, teaching, and 
practice of the Church, even if not in the particular argumentative 
forms in which they more recently have been presented. 
Only the most cavalier disregard for that tradition would judge with 
certainty and without ambivalence that these or any doctrines of the 
Church are indeed examples of dramatically developing doctrine. Nev-
ertheless, theologians occasionally judge, properly with ambivalence 
and without certainty, that a particular doctrine is developing dramat-
ically. No such judgment, though, could undermine the present status 
of the doctrine in question as the authentic teaching of the magiste-
rium, for such a consequence would elevate theological assessment 
above the charism of the Church's teaching authority. Even as they 
stand in the argumentative forms in which the dramatic character of 
their development might be recognized, these doctrines still possess 
the authority that issues from any pronouncement of the ordinary 
magisterium as the authentic interpreter of God's revelation in Scrip-
ture and tradition. The authority of doctrine in the Catholic tradition 
is not measured solely by what has been or at some future time will be 
taught by the magisterium and received by the faithful. Such an ex-
pectation would gauge authority statically by reference to unanimity 
alone, ignoring the much more contested development that many au-
thoritative teachings have had and continue to have in the Catholic 
tradition. Dramatically developing doctrine, then, possesses authority 
for Catholic theology, to say nothing of the life of the Church, as long 
as it continues to be taught authentically by the magisterium. 
Our analysis, however, has led us to value the authority of magis-
terial arguments as charismatic means of promulgating the tradition's 
basic beliefs in present circumstances. While it is important to ac-
knowledge the magisterial authority of these arguments, failures in 
their cogency and reception can only mean that their authority re-
mains ambiguous, and so questionable, for the Church. Although ap-
parently oxymoronic from the perspective of a foundationalist regard 
for the justification of ecclesial belief in which argument and conclu-
sion are separable, the juxtaposition of authority and ambiguity is 
meaningful in a nonfoundationalist regard for the justification of ec-
clesial belief.58 In this epistemic perspective informed by Catholic com-
mitment, argument, conclusion, and basic beliefs are inextricably 
bound together in the historical context of tradition in which the dis-
cernment of God's spirit at work in the Church is rarely, if ever, ex-
haustive. Should magisterial arguments fail to convince, then better, 
more coherent, traditionally faithful arguments need to be offered by 
those in the Church who have the ability to justify ecclesial belief. The 
58
 For further discussion of the idea of ambiguous authority, see John E. Thiel, "Re-
sponsibility to the Spirit: Authority in the Catholic Tradition," New Theology Review 8 
(1995) 53-68. 
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Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian supports this 
directive by encouraging theologians to contribute to the improvement 
of magisterial argument, though it expects theological insights to be 
communicated in private and assumes that such improvement will be 
indifferent to whatever magisterial conclusion has already been 
reached. A more dialogical understanding of ecclesia, and one more 
committed to Vatican I's teaching on the complementarity of faith and 
reason,59 would not fear public discussion in the Church on how its 
basic beliefs are logically extended to present circumstances and would 
be open to the possibility for such dialogue to be the very means of 
doctrinal development.60 The same sensibilities would hold fast to the 
necessary consistency between argument and conclusion in the 
Church's authoritative teaching, regard the cogency of such teaching 
as a value of tradition-bound faith, and remain open to revision in 
authoritative conclusion as well as in authoritative argumentation. 
Reasoned argument truly informed by and demonstrating the con-
sistency of traditional faith can never be extraneous to the authority of 
the Church's teaching, any more than reasoning truly in the service of 
faith can be foreign to the purposes of the Church. The expectation that 
faithful reasoning will lead to utter unanimity among the faithful 
would seem to be a symptom of a foundationalist understanding of its 
workings, as erroneous in the sphere of ecclesial knowledge as it is in 
any other. When conducted authoritatively, ecclesial reasoning re-
spects the pluralism of argumentative possibilities within the tradi-
tion it holds sacred, seeks to align its expectations with what the 
Church has believed and continues to believe, and recognizes its own 
responsibility to the development of Catholic doctrine, even in the rare 
cases when that doctrine develops dramatically. 
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